The Next Decade: Realism and Idealism

Friedman in his book, The Next Decade, speaks to different prevalent foreign policy philosophies.  He breaks the two primary camps espousing their views into Realists and Idealists.  Their names are rather self-explanatory.

Realists say the US, as any other nation, should focus on its national interests, even if that means dealing with countries that perhaps don't practice democracy, high levels of human rights, and other American morals and values (across ideologies).  Certainly that has been done before, Roosevelt with the Soviet Union against Hitler, Nixon with China (and perhaps, Friedman predicts, with Iran.  Or currently, supporting Mubarak in Egypt since he provides a stable anchor for the entire middle east and security of Israel even though he isn't stellar in regards to human rights).  They believe that since we live in a dangerous world, focusing on moral goals diverts from the pursuit of our genuine interests, thereby "endangering the very existence of the republic that is the embodiment of American ideals." (36)

Idealists state the US should operate primarily on the moral principles upon which this country was founded and believe it should continue on (again, across ideologies).  The believe that the moral compass must be first and foremost in our minds when deciding foreign policy.

Friedman proposes that the divide between the two "fundamentally misstates the problem" (36)  He points to several points upon which each side founders.  Idealism: Which takes precedence, national self-determination or human rights (two principles upon which the American revolution was built)? If a country decides to revoke human rights through a constitutional process, or countries that don't hold elections like the US but clearly are wanted by the people based on long standing cultures?  Realism: It typically thinks that the national interests of the 21st century US, which are extraordinarily complex, are as simple as those of an 18th century small nation (simple survival) were.

He says they are really just different sides of the same coin, power.  "Power as an end in itself is a monstrosity that does not achieve anything lasting and will inevitably deform the American regime.  Ideals without power are simply words-they can come alive only when reinforced by the capacity to act." (37)  Acting for power as an end in itself ends up essentially being thuggish and not worth anything, but in a real world only working with regimes that function and think as you do won't allow you to get anything done.  He then goes onto speak about how America can't shun powers that don't behave exactly as we do, that they will often still be useful to fulfilling our primary goal of national self interest, the interest of preserving the American republic which stands for those values.  He makes a very interesting statement "The pursuit of moral ends requires a willingness to sup with the devil." (38)  He takes a rather utilitarian view of the world, it is hard to say completely from this book, but almost a view that the ends justify the means.  However, he ends with a statement concerning the next decade, the President of the US will need to grapple with both ends.  "he must choose the uncomfortable synthesis of the two that Machiavelli recommended.  The president must focus not only on the accumulation and use of power but on its limits. A good regime backed by power and leaders who understand the virtue both of the regime and of power is what is required." (40)

This brought an interesting question to my mind, as a Christian.  God has put government into place as a means to restrain evil in this world, he has given it a sphere of authority.

"Is there any activity or deed necessary for the basic function and survival of a state that is immoral or sinful/wrong for a Christian to do?"

If it was truly pared down, could a Christian do any job or position within a government that is necessary for its survival, without sinning?  One side of the issue seems to say yes, if it is truly a job requiring its survival, God created this institution, how could He require it to do something that was wrong (unless perhaps the view is taken that if something is wrong it shouldn't be done and if it is time for the nation to collapse, that was God's plan)?  But on the other hand, this is a fallen world and things aren't perfect (though government was instituted after the fall).  This is a pertinent question to think about, whether directly involved in politics and foreign policy decisions, or simply voting for politicians making those decisions.  Among many things, I think a very visible application of this question is pacifism.  If war or violence, in the proper context, is necessary for the survival of the state (which while it could be argued either way, I think a realistic view of human nature would say it is), is it wrong to be involved in the proper act of war?  Even if it was necessary for it to be done to survive, should you not be involved in it and let others who have no qualms "do the dirty work" so to speak?  Something to ponder.


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The Next Decade: Terrorism

Alright, so I've had the chance to read a little bit more of The Next Decade.  Friedman has now spent a little time talking about terrorism and the "War on Terrorism" over the past decade, what it has done and what needs to/will change about it.  He makes the point that terrorism isn't really an existential threat to the US, while it will occasionally happen and people will die, it can't do enough damage to threaten the existence of America, "terrorism in and of itself cannot destroy the material basis of the American republic" (73).  The point of terrorism is to use force multipliers, to focus on the psyche to make the terrorist appear more powerful than he really is.  The US has made combating terrorism the central thrust of American global strategy, to the detriment of strategy and issues elsewhere.  Terrorism cannot be eliminated, it is impossible.  To do so would require wiping out entire people groups, obviously not possible or desirable, and this in turn would probably create other groups who didn't like this and would then take over the job of terrorism; even totalitarian states are unable to completely stop such attacks.  This has created an unbalanced foreign policy; while Friedman isn't saying to ignore terrorism, it must be seen in light of the overall national strategy.  Certainly a certain amount of resources should be devoted to preventing terrorism, but the nation needs to also not have a singular focus on one area and be aware and able to respond to events of national interest around the world, such as Russia expanding its sphere of influence over the last decade as they've observed the US being tied up in the middle east.  Or the fact that taking out Iraq created a vacuum in the balance of power in the middle east; it used to be Iraq and Iran balancing each other in the middle east to prevent either from becoming too powerful, now Iraq is incapable of doing that anymore, which then puts the US in a poor position to negotiate with Iran.

Here is where Friedman takes on a pragmatic view of the Presidency.  In response, to say a terrorist attack, a President must soothe the nerves of the public and show his efforts to stop terrorism, but he shouldn't act in a manner that is disproportionate to the effect and shouldn't try the impossible.  "He can lie to the public, but he must never lie to himself." (75)  What this is saying is Friedman believe at times the President must say one thing to soothe and pacify the public, but in reality knows he can't fully act through on that because the costs are way too high for a negligible benefit and keep in mind the long term interests of the US, and so must in reality act else wise.  This has been done in history before, such as Roosevelt calling for vengeance on the Japanese after Pearl Harbor but privately focusing on Germany first, not Japan, because he believed that is what was necessary to win the war. Among other interesting ethical issues presented in this book (and other STRATFOR writings), this is an interesting one, is it ethical for a President to lie to the people when necessary for the "greater good" of the country, knowing he can't tell the full truth, that he must convey a sense of being able to accomplish something even when he knows it can't be done?  Is that OK?  Like I mentioned above, it has been done before, and perhaps should have been done this decade with regards to terrorism, I don't know, but is it right?

From here his main point concerning the next decade is that the US must not focus singularly on terrorism, but must define its interests in different regions throughout the world and deal with them accordingly and proportionately.  To prevent regional hegemons and preserve its balance of power strategy throughout the globe.

I think my next post will touch on his discussion of foreign policy philosophy/paradigm, particularly idealism and realism.


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The Next Decade

So, I feel like should post again since it has been nearly a year, I am absolutely terrible at keeping up with this thing.

So, I thought I'd comment briefly on a book I am currently reading (since it's laying on the desk next to me) called "The Next Decade: Where We've Been...and Where We're Going" by George Friedman of STRATFOR. I have posted on topics along this line before. George Friedman is the founder and CEO of STRATFOR, a private intelligence and global analysis firm with a lot of interesting things to say about world events happening, and where things could go from here. I read his book "The Next 100 Years" a couple years ago and he had a lot of interesting things to say about the world and where it is probably heading in the next century. He is certainly aware that predicting a century with any detail is impossible, but he does believe overall trends and ideas can be predicted. He made some interesting predictions such as China slowing way down/crashing within the next 20 years and having internal turmoil, despite what many people say. He also thinks we'll have another, albeit less intense, cold war with Russie in the next few decades and that countries such as Turkey and Poland will come onto the world stage. (For more on this see a previous post)

Anyways, this book came out last week and he has narrowed it down to just the next decade. So far he has mainly talked about America and its place in the world and how it affects all of the world in so many ways, regardless of whether you want it to or not (he tries to stay as ideologically agnostic as much as he can and just look at the facts, both a virtue and a vice I think). As I get further into this book, I'll try to share a little more on some of his predictions. The interesting thing about his perspective on Geopolitics is he sees it (especially longer term) as very deterministic. Everything is dependent on geography. What countries will and won't do, and can and can't do comes down very much to geography. Whether you have fertile agricultural land for wealth with a navigable river down it (the US) or no river making it nearly useless (Russia, parts of Europe), or whether you are placed strategically (Poland in the northern European plain between Europe and Russia) in a position that has strategic value essentially always. Shorter term, such as a decade, he believe leaders (particularly the President of the US) individual decisions affect people's lives a lot, but in the long run things will go the way they will nearly regardless of individual decisions by leaders. I think he can see a lot that others can't perhaps, but I think he misses the mark sometimes because he does neglect the human factors (that are so hard to predict) such as society and religion and family and morals and the things that those can affect. He takes a very pragmatic, utilitarian, and often Machiavellian view.

Well, that's enough for now, I'd encourage you to check out the website, they have a lot fo good information; a good free weekly email and a good subscription service that is reasonably priced it you're a student.

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The Islamists Cast Their Ballot In Mumbai

This is an interesting article published by Stratfor, a private open source intelligence and analysis company. This article talks about the recent attacks in Mumbai, India by what appears to be radical Islamists from Pakistan. This is very interesting as it is happening on the verge of a power change in the U.S. and this will certainly have an effect on our strategy in Afghanistan. Basically India has to do something to repsond to these attacks since their government is already extremly weak and if not response is shown they will almost certainly fall and be replaced by a far more nationalist government. However, any type of confrontation with Pakistan isn't particularly desirable with Pakistan being a large nation which would be hard to control and they have nuclear weapons. The U.S. will have something to say as they might attempt to mediate again as they did in the 2001-2002 crisis, but the U.S. needs some sort of cooperation from Pakistan in order to facilitate success in the Petraeus and Obama plans for Afghanistan. Anyways, that is a brief summary and this will be very interesting to see it unfold over the enxt several days or so. As a side note Stratfor is a very god website for international analysis.

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By George Friedman

Related Special Topic Page

• Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences

Last Wednesday evening, a group of Islamist operatives carried out a complex terror operation in the Indian city of Mumbai. The attack was not complex because of the weapons used or its size, but in the apparent training, multiple methods of approaching the city and excellent operational security and discipline in the final phases of the operation, when the last remaining attackers held out in the Taj Mahal hotel for several days. The operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets, from railroad stations to hospitals, indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city.

While it is not clear precisely who carried out the Mumbai attack, two separate units apparently were involved. One group, possibly consisting of Indian Muslims, was established in Mumbai ahead of the attacks. The second group appears to have just arrived. It traveled via ship from Karachi, Pakistan, later hijacked a small Indian vessel to get past Indian coastal patrols, and ultimately landed near Mumbai.

Extensive preparations apparently had been made, including surveillance of the targets. So while the precise number of attackers remains unclear, the attack clearly was well-planned and well-executed.

Evidence and logic suggest that radical Pakistani Islamists carried out the attack. These groups have a highly complex and deliberately amorphous structure. Rather than being centrally controlled, ad hoc teams are created with links to one or more groups. Conceivably, they might have lacked links to any group, but this is hard to believe. Too much planning and training were involved in this attack for it to have been conceived by a bunch of guys in a garage. While precisely which radical Pakistani Islamist group or groups were involved is unknown, the Mumbai attack appears to have originated in Pakistan. It could have been linked to al Qaeda prime or its various franchises and/or to Kashmiri insurgents.

More important than the question of the exact group that carried out the attack, however, is the attackers’ strategic end. There is a tendency to regard terror attacks as ends in themselves, carried out simply for the sake of spreading terror. In the highly politicized atmosphere of Pakistan’s radical Islamist factions, however, terror frequently has a more sophisticated and strategic purpose. Whoever invested the time and took the risk in organizing this attack had a reason to do so. Let’s work backward to that reason by examining the logical outcomes following this attack.

An End to New Delhi’s Restraint

The most striking aspect of the Mumbai attack is the challenge it presents to the Indian government — a challenge almost impossible for New Delhi to ignore. A December 2001 Islamist attack on the Indian parliament triggered an intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has not responded in a dramatic fashion to numerous Islamist attacks against India that were traceable to Pakistan. The Mumbai attack, by contrast, aimed to force a response from New Delhi by being so grievous that any Indian government showing only a muted reaction to it would fall.

India’s restrained response to Islamist attacks (even those originating in Pakistan) in recent years has come about because New Delhi has understood that, for a host of reasons, Islamabad has been unable to control radical Pakistani Islamist groups. India did not want war with Pakistan; it felt it had more important issues to deal with. New Delhi therefore accepted Islamabad’s assurances that Pakistan would do its best to curb terror attacks, and after suitable posturing, allowed tensions originating from Islamist attacks to pass.

This time, however, the attackers struck in such a way that New Delhi couldn’t allow the incident to pass. As one might expect, public opinion in India is shifting from stunned to furious. India’s Congress party-led government is politically weak and nearing the end of its life span. It lacks the political power to ignore the attack, even if it were inclined to do so. If it ignored the attack, it would fall, and a more intensely nationalist government would take its place. It is therefore very difficult to imagine circumstances under which the Indians could respond to this attack in the same manner they have to recent Islamist attacks.

What the Indians actually will do is not clear. In 2001-2002, New Delhi responded to the attack on the Indian parliament by moving forces close to the Pakistani border and the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, engaging in artillery duels along the front, and bringing its nuclear forces to a high level of alert. The Pakistanis made a similar response. Whether India ever actually intended to attack Pakistan remains unclear, but either way, New Delhi created an intense crisis in Pakistan.

The U.S. and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis

The United States used this crisis for its own ends. Having just completed the first phase of its campaign in Afghanistan, Washington was intensely pressuring Pakistan’s then-Musharraf government to expand cooperation with the United States; purge its intelligence organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of radical Islamists; and crack down on al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had been reluctant to cooperate with Washington, as doing so inevitably would spark a massive domestic backlash against his government.

The crisis with India produced an opening for the United States. Eager to get India to stand down from the crisis, the Pakistanis looked to the Americans to mediate. And the price for U.S. mediation was increased cooperation from Pakistan with the United States. The Indians, not eager for war, backed down from the crisis after guarantees that Islamabad would impose stronger controls on Islamist groups in Kashmir.

In 2001-2002, the Indo-Pakistani crisis played into American hands. In 2008, the new Indo-Pakistani crisis might play differently. The United States recently has demanded increased Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, President-elect Barack Obama has stated his intention to focus on Afghanistan and pressure the Pakistanis.

Therefore, one of Islamabad’s first responses to the new Indo-Pakistani crisis was to announce that if the Indians increased their forces along Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan would be forced to withdraw 100,000 troops from its western border with Afghanistan. In other words, threats from India would cause Pakistan to dramatically reduce its cooperation with the United States in the Afghan war. The Indian foreign minister is flying to the United States to meet with Obama; obviously, this matter will be discussed among others.

We expect the United States to pressure India not to create a crisis, in order to avoid this outcome. As we have said, the problem is that it is unclear whether politically the Indians can afford restraint. At the very least, New Delhi must demand that the Pakistani government take steps to make the ISI and Pakistan’s other internal security apparatus more effective. Even if the Indians concede that there was no ISI involvement in the attack, they will argue that the ISI is incapable of stopping such attacks. They will demand a purge and reform of the ISI as a sign of Pakistani commitment. Barring that, New Delhi will move troops to the Indo-Pakistani frontier to intimidate Pakistan and placate Indian public opinion.

Dilemmas for Islamabad, New Delhi and Washington

At that point, Islamabad will have a serious problem. The Pakistani government is even weaker than the Indian government. Pakistan’s civilian regime does not control the Pakistani military, and therefore does not control the ISI. The civilians can’t decide to transform Pakistani security, and the military is not inclined to make this transformation. (Pakistan’s military has had ample opportunity to do so if it wished.)

Pakistan faces the challenge, just one among many, that its civilian and even military leadership lack the ability to reach deep into the ISI and security services to transform them. In some ways, these agencies operate under their own rules. Add to this the reality that the ISI and security forces — even if they are acting more assertively, as Islamabad claims — are demonstrably incapable of controlling radical Islamists in Pakistan. If they were capable, the attack on Mumbai would have been thwarted in Pakistan. The simple reality is that in Pakistan’s case, the will to make this transformation does not seem to be present, and even if it were, the ability to suppress terror attacks isn’t there.

The United States might well want to limit New Delhi’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on her way to India to discuss just this. But the politics of India’s situation make it unlikely that the Indians can do anything more than listen. It is more than simply a political issue for New Delhi; the Indians have no reason to believe that the Mumbai operation was one of a kind. Further operations like the Mumbai attack might well be planned. Unless the Pakistanis shift their posture inside Pakistan, India has no way of knowing whether other such attacks can be stymied. The Indians will be sympathetic to Washington’s plight in Afghanistan and the need to keep Pakistani troops at the Afghan border. But New Delhi will need something that the Americans — and in fact the Pakistanis — can’t deliver: a guarantee that there will be no more attacks like this one.

The Indian government cannot chance inaction. It probably would fall if it did. Moreover, in the event of inactivity and another attack, Indian public opinion probably will swing to an uncontrollable extreme. If an attack takes place but India has moved toward crisis posture with Pakistan, at least no one can argue that the Indian government remained passive in the face of threats to national security. Therefore, India is likely to refuse American requests for restraint.

It is possible that New Delhi will make a radical proposal to Rice, however. Given that the Pakistani government is incapable of exercising control in its own country, and given that Pakistan now represents a threat to both U.S. and Indian national security, the Indians might suggest a joint operation with the Americans against Pakistan.

What that joint operation might entail is uncertain, but regardless, this is something that Rice would reject out of hand and that Obama would reject in January 2009. Pakistan has a huge population and nuclear weapons, and the last thing Bush or Obama wants is to practice nation-building in Pakistan. The Indians, of course, will anticipate this response. The truth is that New Delhi itself does not want to engage deep in Pakistan to strike at militant training camps and other Islamist sites. That would be a nightmare. But if Rice shows up with a request for Indian restraint and no concrete proposal — or willingness to entertain a proposal — for solving the Pakistani problem, India will be able to refuse on the grounds that the Americans are asking India to absorb a risk (more Mumbai-style attacks) without the United States’ willingness to share in the risk.

Setting the Stage for a New Indo-Pakistani Confrontation

That will set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India will push forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, move its nuclear forces to an alert level, begin shelling Pakistan, and perhaps — given the seriousness of the situation — attack short distances into Pakistan and even carry out airstrikes deep in Pakistan. India will demand greater transparency for New Delhi in Pakistani intelligence operations. The Indians will not want to occupy Pakistan; they will want to occupy Pakistan’s security apparatus.

Naturally, the Pakistanis will refuse that. There is no way they can give India, their main adversary, insight into Pakistani intelligence operations. But without that access, India has no reason to trust Pakistan. This will leave the Indians in an odd position: They will be in a near-war posture, but will have made no demands of Pakistan that Islamabad can reasonably deliver and that would benefit India. In one sense, India will be gesturing. In another sense, India will be trapped by making a gesture on which Pakistan cannot deliver. The situation thus could get out of hand.

In the meantime, the Pakistanis certainly will withdraw forces from western Pakistan and deploy them in eastern Pakistan. That will mean that one leg of the Petraeus and Obama plans would collapse. Washington’s expectation of greater Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border will disappear along with the troops. This will free the Taliban from whatever limits the Pakistani army had placed on it. The Taliban’s ability to fight would increase, while the motivation for any of the Taliban to enter talks — as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has suggested — would decline. U.S. forces, already stretched to the limit, would face an increasingly difficult situation, while pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas would decrease.

Now, step back and consider the situation the Mumbai attackers have created. First, the Indian government faces an internal political crisis driving it toward a confrontation it didn’t plan on. Second, the minimum Pakistani response to a renewed Indo-Pakistani crisis will be withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, thereby strengthening the Taliban and securing al Qaeda. Third, sufficient pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government could cause it to collapse, opening the door to a military-Islamist government — or it could see Pakistan collapse into chaos, giving Islamists security in various regions and an opportunity to reshape Pakistan. Finally, the United States’ situation in Afghanistan has now become enormously more complex.

By staging an attack the Indian government can’t ignore, the Mumbai attackers have set in motion an existential crisis for Pakistan. The reality of Pakistan cannot be transformed, trapped as the country is between the United States and India. Almost every evolution from this point forward benefits Islamists. Strategically, the attack on Mumbai was a precise blow struck to achieve uncertain but favorable political outcomes for the Islamists.

Rice’s trip to India now becomes the crucial next step. She wants Indian restraint. She does not want the western Pakistani border to collapse. But she cannot guarantee what India must have: assurance of no further terror attacks on India originating in Pakistan. Without that, India must do something. No Indian government could survive without some kind of action. So it is up to Rice, in one of her last acts as secretary of state, to come up with a miraculous solution to head off a final, catastrophic crisis for the Bush administration — and a defining first crisis for the new Obama administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once said that the enemy gets a vote. The Islamists cast their ballot in Mumbai.

Posted with permission and attribution to Stratfor.

Israeli Training Exercise

As you may have heard if you have been listening to the news recently, the Israelis have done a relatively long distance training mission involving a large number of F-15 and F-16 warplanes. At first this has been reported as a warning and practice towards an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities. This is an article that I thought was very interesting regarding this, and why that doesn't make sense. It is from Stratfor, an independent intelligence analyst company. This is reproduced with permission.


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Mediterranean Flyover: Telegraphing an Israeli Punch?

June 23, 2008

By George Friedman

On June 20, The New York Times published a report saying that more than 100 Israeli aircraft carried out an exercise in early June over the eastern Mediterranean Sea and Greece. The article pointed out that the distances covered were roughly the distances from Israel to Iranian nuclear sites and that the exercise was a trial run for a large-scale air strike against Iran. On June 21, the British newspaper The Times quoted Israeli military sources as saying that the exercise was a dress rehearsal for an attack on Iran. The Jerusalem Post, in covering these events, pointedly referred to an article it had published in May saying that Israeli intelligence had changed its forecast for Iran passing a nuclear threshold — whether this was simply the ability to cause an explosion under controlled conditions or the ability to produce an actual weapon was unclear — to 2008 rather than 2009.

The New York Times article, positioned on the front page, captured the attention of everyone from oil traders to Iran, which claimed that this was entirely psychological warfare on the part of the Israelis and that Israel could not carry out such an attack. It was not clear why the Iranians thought an attack was impossible, but they were surely right in saying that the exercise was psychological warfare. The Israelis did everything they could to publicize the exercise, and American officials, who obviously knew about the exercise but had not publicized it, backed them up. What is important to note is that the fact that this was psychological warfare — and fairly effective, given the Iranian response — does not mean that Israel is not going to attack. One has nothing to do with the other. So the question of whether there is going to be an attack must be analyzed carefully.

The first issue, of course, is what might be called the “red line.” It has always been expected that once the Iranians came close to a line at which they would become a capable nuclear power, the Americans or the Israelis would act to stop them, neither being prepared to tolerate a nuclear Iran. What has never been clear is what constitutes that red line. It could simply be having produced sufficient fissionable material to build a bomb, having achieved a nuclear explosion under test conditions in Iran or having approached the point of producing a deliverable nuclear weapon.

Early this month, reports circulated that A.Q. Khan, the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear program who is accused of selling nuclear technology to such countries as Libya, North Korea and Iran, had also possessed detailed design specifications and blueprints for constructing a nuclear weapon small enough to be mounted on missiles available to North Korea and Iran. The blueprints were found on a computer owned by a Swiss businessman, but the reports pointedly said that it was not known whether these documents had been transferred to Iran or any other country. It was interesting that the existence of the blueprints in Switzerland was known to the United States — and, we assume, Israel — in 2006 but that, at this point, there was no claim that they had been transferred.

Clearly, the existence of these documents — if Iran had a copy of them — would have helped the Iranians clear some hurdles. However, as we have pointed out, there is a huge gap between having enriched uranium and having a deliverable weapon, the creation of which requires technologies totally unrelated to each other. Ruggedizing and miniaturizing a nuclear device requires specializations from materials science to advanced electronics. Therefore, having enriched uranium or even triggering an underground nuclear device still leaves you a long way from having a weapon.

That’s why the leak on the nuclear blueprints is so important. From the Israeli and American point of view, those blueprints give the Iranians the knowledge of precisely how to ruggedize and miniaturize a nuclear device. But there are two problems here. First, if we were given blueprints for building a bridge, they would bring us no closer to building one. We would need experts in multiple disciplines just to understand the blueprints and thousands of trained engineers and workers to actually build the bridge. Second, the Israelis and Americans have known about the blueprints for two years. Even if they were certain that they had gotten to the Iranians — which the Israelis or Americans would certainly have announced in order to show the increased pressure at least one of them would be under to justify an attack — it is unclear how much help the blueprints would have been to the Iranians. The Jerusalem Post story implied that the Iranians were supposed to be c rossing an undefined line in 2009. It is hard to imagine that they were speeded up to 2008 by a document delivered in 2006, and that the Israelis only just noticed.

In the end, the Israelis may have intelligence indicating that the blueprints did speed things up, and that the Iranians might acquire nuclear weapons in 2008. We doubt that. But given the statements Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has made over the years, the Israelis have to be planning based on worst-case scenarios. What the sum total of their leaks adds up to is an attempt to communicate widely that there is an increased urgency in dealing with Iran, based on intelligence that the Iranian program is farther along than previously thought.

The problem is the fact that the Israelis are communicating. In fact, they are going out of their way to communicate. That is extremely odd. If the Israelis were intending to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, they would want to be absolutely certain that as much of the equipment in the facilities was destroyed as possible. But the hard truth is that the heart of Iran’s capability, such as it is, does not reside in its facilities but in its scientists, engineers and technicians who collectively constitute the knowledge base of Iran’s nuclear program. Facilities can be replaced. It would take at least a generation to replace what we already regard as an insufficient cadre of expertise.

Therefore, if Israel wanted not simply to take out current facilities but to take Iran out of the nuclear game for a very long time, killing these people would have to be a major strategic goal. The Israelis would want to strike in the middle of the workday, without any warning whatever. If they strike Iran, they will be condemned widely for their actions. The additional criticism that would come from killing the workforce would not be a large price to pay for really destroying the Iranian capabilities. Unlike the Iraqi reactor strike in 1981, when the Israelis struck at night to minimize casualties, this strike against a more sophisticated program could not afford to be squeamish.

There are obviously parts of Iran’s nuclear capability that cannot be moved. There is other equipment that can be, with enough warning and with more or less difficulty, moved to unknown locations. But nothing would be easier to disperse than the heart of the program — the people. They could be moved out of harm’s way with only an hour’s notice. Therefore, providing warning that an attack was coming makes very little sense. It runs counter to basic principles of warfare. The Israelis struck the Osirak reactor in Iraq in 1981 with not the slightest hint of the attack’s imminence. That was one of the reasons it was successful. Telegraphing your punch is not very smart in these circumstances.

The Israelis have done more than raise the possibility that an attack might be launched in 2008. They have publicized how they plan to do it. Based on the number and type of aircraft involved in the exercise — more than 100 F-15 and F-16 fighter jets — one Israeli attack scenario could involve a third of Israel’s inventory of fourth-generation strike aircraft, including most of its latest-model F-15I Ra’am and F-16I Sufa fighter bombers. If Greece were the target in this exercise, then the equivalent distance would mean that the Israelis are planning to cross Jordanian airspace, transit through Iraq and strike Iran from that direction. A strike through Turkey — and there is no indication that the Turks would permit it — would take much longer.

The most complex part of the operation’s logistics would be the refueling of aircraft. They would have to be orbiting in Iraqi airspace. One of the points discussed about the Mediterranean exercise was the role of Israeli helicopters in rescuing downed flyers. Rescue helicopters would be involved, but we doubt very much they would be entering Iranian airspace from Israel. They are a lot slower than the jets, and they would have to be moving hours ahead of time. The Iranians might not spot them but the Russians would, and there is no guarantee that they wouldn’t pass it on to the Iranians. That means that the Israeli helicopters would have to move quietly into Iraq and be based there.

And that means that this would have to be a joint American-Israeli operation. The United States controls Iraqi airspace, meaning that the Americans would have to permit Israeli tankers to orbit in Iraqi airspace. The search-and-rescue helicopters would have to be based there. And we strongly suspect that rescued pilots would not be ferried back to Israel by helicopter but would either be sent to U.S. hospitals in Iraq or transferred to Israeli aircraft in Iraq.

The point here is that, given the exercise the Israelis carried out and the distances involved, there is no way Israel could do this without the direct cooperation of the United States. From a political standpoint in the region, it is actually easier for the United States to take out Iran’s facilities than for it to help the Israelis do so. There are many Sunni states that might formally protest but be quite pleased to see the United States do the job. But if the Israelis were to do it, Sunni states would have to be much more serious in their protestations. In having the United States play the role of handmaiden in the Israeli operation, it would appear that the basic charge against the United States — that it is the handmaiden of the Israelis — is quite true. If the Americans are going to be involved in a strike against Iran’s nuclear program, they are far better off doing it themselves than playing a supporting role to Israel.

There is something not quite right in this whole story. The sudden urgency — replete with tales of complete blueprints that might be in Iranian hands — doesn’t make sense. We may be wrong, but we have no indication that Iran is that close to producing nuclear weapons. Second, the extreme publicity given the exercise in the Mediterranean, coming from both Israel and the United States, runs counter to the logic of the mission. Third, an attack on Iran through Iraqi airspace would create a political nightmare for the United States. If this is the Israeli attack plan, the Americans would appear to be far better off doing it themselves.

There are a number of possible explanations. On the question of urgency, the Israelis might have two things in mind. One is the rumored transfer of S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia to Iran. This transfer has been rumored for quite a while, but by all accounts has yet to happen. The S-300 is a very capable system, depending on the variety (and it is unclear which variety is being transferred), and it would increase the cost and complexity of any airstrike against Iran. Israel may have heard that the Russians are planning to begin transferring the missiles sometime in 2008.

Second, there is obviously the U.S. presidential election. George W. Bush will be out of office in early 2009, and it is possible that Barack Obama will be replacing him. The Israelis have made no secret of their discomfort with an Obama presidency. Obviously, Israel cannot attack Iran without U.S. cooperation. The Israelis’ timetable may be moved up because they are not certain that Obama will permit an attack later on. [Blog Author's note: Here is another article regarding that.]

There are also explanations for the extreme publicity surrounding the exercise. The first might be that the Israelis have absolutely no intention of trying to stage long-range attacks but are planning some other type of attack altogether. The possibilities range from commando raids to cruise missiles fired from Israeli submarines in the Arabian Sea — or something else entirely. The Mediterranean exercise might have been designed to divert attention.

Alternatively, the Israelis could be engaged in exhausting Iranian defenders. During the first Gulf War, U.S. aircraft rushed toward the Iraqi border night after night for weeks, pulling away and landing each time. The purpose was to get the Iraqis to see these feints as routine and slow down their reactions when U.S. aircraft finally attacked. The Israelis could be engaged in a version of this, tiring out the Iranians with a series of “emergencies” so they are less responsive in the event of a real strike.

Finally, the Israelis and Americans might not be intending an attack at all. Rather, they are — as the Iranians have said — engaged in psychological warfare for political reasons. The Iranians appear to be split now between those who think that Ahmadinejad has led Iran into an extremely dangerous situation and those who think Ahmadinejad has done a fine job. The prospect of an imminent and massive attack on Iran could give his opponents ammunition against him. This would explain the Iranian government response to the reports of a possible attack — which was that such an attack was just psychological warfare and could not happen. That clearly was directed more for internal consumption than it was for the Israelis or Americans.

We tend toward this latter theory. Frankly, the Bush administration has been talking about an attack on Iran for years. It is hard for us to see that the situation has changed materially over the past months. But if it has, then either Israel or the United States would have attacked — and not with front-page spreads in The New York Times before the attack was launched. In the end, we tend toward the view that this is psychological warfare for the simple reason that you don’t launch a surprise attack of the kind necessary to take out Iran’s nuclear program with a media blitz beforehand. It just doesn’t work that way.